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ABSTRACT: The Insight discusses order 182/2020 of 30 July 2020 of the Italian Constitutional Court 
against the background of the latter Court’s approach to dual preliminarity inaugurated in decision 
269/2017. It argues that the order confirms an expansionist trend as regards the scope of the 
Court’s competence in cases concerning the violation of fundamental rights granted both by the 
Constitution and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. At the same time, 
however, the order is permeated by a spirit of loyal and constructive collaboration with the Court 
of Justice, which emerges, notably, from the approach to the preliminary ruling procedure. 
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I. Introduction 
Through order 182/2020,1 the Italian Constitutional Court (CC) recently sought guidance 
from the Court of Justice2 in ascertaining the compatibility with EU law of national provi-
sions that award childbirth and maternity allowances only to non-EU citizens holding an 
EU long-term residence permit.3 According to the referring court, the Court of Cassation, 
 
* Assistant Professor of EU law, University of Florence, nicole.lazzerini@unifi.it. I am grateful to the 
anonymous reviewers as well as to Professors Giorgio Gaja, Chiara Favilli and Daniele Gallo for their pre-
cious comments on a draft version of this Insight. The usual disclaimers apply. 
1 Constitutional Court, order no. 182 of 30 July 2020. The English translation is available at 
www.cortecostituzionale.it. The English translation of the other decisions of the CC referred to in this In-
sight can also be found in the CC’s website. 
2 The request was registered as case C-350/20, INPS. 
3 The national provisions under scrutiny are Art. 1, para. 125, of Law no. 190 of 23 December 2014 
(Stability Law 2015) and Art. 74 of Legislative Decree no. 151 of 26 March 2001 (Consolidated text of legis-
lative provisions on the protection of and support for maternity and paternity). These provisions contain 
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the national provisions at issue would violate fundamental rights granted, at the same 
time, by the Italian Constitution and the Charter of fundamental rights of the European 
Union (EU Charter). Thus, order 182/2020 – the fifth request for a preliminary ruling is-
sued by the CC – is the second one, following order 117/2019,4 rooted in the approach to 
dual preliminarity that had been inaugurated by the CC in decision 269/2017.5  
By holding the referrals admissible, the CC confirmed that, when national law en-
tails the violation of both the Constitution and the EU Charter,6 ordinary courts have an 
alternative to requesting a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice and/or immedi-
ately disapplying national law as incompatible with directly effective EU law provisions. 
In fact, after order 182/2020, the scope of the CC’s new competence seems wider than 
what had emerged from previous decisions. At the same time, however, the order is 
permeated by a spirit of loyal and constructive collaboration with the Court of Justice, 
which was absent in decision 269/2017 and in subsequent decisions where the CC re-
fined its position. The shift in attitude emerges, notably, from the CC’s approach to the 
preliminary ruling procedure.  
This Insight focuses on the contribution of order 182/2020 to shaping the CC’s com-
petence on dual preliminarity inaugurated by decision 269/2017. A discussion on the 
role of the dialogue between the CC and the Court of Justice in enhancing social inclu-
sion of legally resident third country nationals is, by contrast, outside the scope of this 
analysis.7 Accordingly, section II briefly recapitulates the evolution of the CC’s approach 
to dual preliminarity after decision 269/2017. Sections III and IV summarize, respective-
ly, the legal background of the case and the content of order 182/2020. Sections V to VII 
then engage with the lights and shadows of the CC’s reasoning, tackling three main is-
sues, namely the approach to the scope of the new competence, the preliminary ruling 
procedure and the parameters for constitutional review.  
 
a reference to Art. 9 of Legislative Decree no. 286 of 1998, Testo unico sull’immigrazione (Immigration 
Code), which in turn concerns the permit for long-term residents. 
4 Constitutional Court, order no. 117 of 10 May 2019. The case, which is registered as C-481/19, Con-
sob, is currently pending before the Court of Justice.  
5 Constitutional Court, decision no. 267 of 14 December 2017. 
6 It must be stressed that the Court’s approach only concerns cases within the scope of EU law, in which 
the Member States are bound to apply the EU Charter: see the latter’s Art. 51, para. 1, and the interpretation 
provided by the Court of Justice, judgment 26 February 2013, case C-617/10, Fransson, paras 17 to 23. The 
essence of the case law inaugurated with Fransson is that the EU Charter can apply only when a rule of EU 
law other than the EU Charter provisions invoked is applicable to the case in the main proceedings. In turn, 
since decision no. 80 of 11 March 2011, the CC held that EU Charter provisions can be invoked in the context 
of constitutional review of national legislation only when the case in the main proceedings is governed by EU 
law (cf. point 5.5). More recently, the CC confirmed this position in decision no. 190 of 31 July 2020.  
7 For a discussion on the merits of the case, see S. GIUBBONI, L’accesso all’assistenza sociale degli strani-
eri alla luce (fioca) dell’art. 34 della Carta dei diritti fondamentali dell’Unione europea (a margine di un recente 
rinvio pregiudiziale alla Corte costituzionale), in Giurisprudenza costituzionale, forthcoming.  
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II. Dual preliminarity after decision 269/2017: taking fundamental 
rights differently 
Before decision 269/2017, the path that ordinary courts should follow to solve antino-
mies between national law and EU law depended solely on the nature of the EU law 
provision(s) at issue. In line with the Simmenthal case-law of the Court of Justice,8 ordi-
nary courts should immediately disapply national provisions incompatible with EU law 
rules with direct effect, after asking for a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice, 
where necessary. By contrast, a referral to the CC was (and is) necessary when national 
law is in contrast with EU law provisions that lack direct effect. 
After decision 269/2017, ordinary courts can opt to go to the CC when national law 
seemingly violates fundamental rights granted by both the Constitution and the EU 
Charter. As we shall see in section V below, the new competence encompasses not only 
the contrast between national law and an EU Charter provision with direct effect;9 it al-
so extends to situations in which national law breaches (prima facie) directly effective EU 
secondary law provisions that “relate” to a fundamental right granted by the EU Charter. 
Thus, on a request by an ordinary court, the CC will perform its review “in light of inter-
nal parameters and, potentially, European ones as well […], in the order that is appro-
priate to the specific case”.10 If the scrutiny leads to a finding of unconstitutionality, the 
national legislation will be eliminated with erga omnes effects.  
Decision 269/2017 raised several concerns regarding the compatibility of the new 
competence advocated by the CC with the established Court of Justice case law on pri-
 
8 Court of Justice, judgment of 9 March 1978, case C-106/77, Amministrazione delle finanze dello Stato 
v. Simmenthal, para. 24. 
9 The Court of Justice laid down the test to establish which EU Charter provisions can be relied on to 
disapply contrasting national law in its judgment of 15 January 2014, case C-176/12, Association de Média-
tion Sociale (AMS). The Court referred to EU Charter provisions that are “sufficient in [themselves] to con-
fer on individuals an individual right which they may invoke as such” (see, notably, paras 41-49). On that 
occasion, the Court acknowledged the direct effect of Art. 21, para. 1, of the EU Charter, with respect to 
prohibition of discrimination on grounds of age; at the same time, it held that Art. 27 of the EU Charter, 
on the right to information and consultation within the undertaking, lacked that quality. The Court of Jus-
tice reiterated and applied the AMS test in the context of cases that, like AMS, called in question the hori-
zontal application of the EU Charter: see judgment of 17 April 2018, case C-414/16, Egenberger, paras 76-
78; judgment of 6 November 2018, case C-596/16, Bauer, paras 87-91; judgment of 22 January 2019, case 
C-193/17, Cresco Investigation, para. 76. In these judgments, the Court acknowledged the direct effect of 
Art. 21, para. 1 (with respect to the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion), Art. 31, para. 2 
(in relation to the worker’s right to paid annual leave), and Art. 47 (on effective judicial protection). In the 
literature, see, inter alia, E. FRANTZIOU, (Most of) the Charter of Fundamental Rights is Horizontally Applicable, 
in European Constitutional Law Review, 2019, p. 306 et seq. In its judgment of 29 July 2019, case C-556/17, 
Torubarov, para. 56, the Court of Justice relied on the AMS test in the context of a vertical case, in relation 
to Art. 47 of the EU Charter. 
10 Constitutional Court, decision 269/2017, cit., para. 5.2.  
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macy, direct effect and the preliminary ruling.11 However, the CC introduced important 
adjustments in subsequent cases.12  
First, when they consider that national law applicable to the case is in contrast with a 
fundamental right granted both by the Constitution and the EU Charter, ordinary courts 
have the possibility, rather than the duty to raise a question of constitutionality (unless in 
case there may be a breach of one of the “counter-limits” to the application of EU law set 
forth in the constitutional system).13 Second, ordinary courts remain free to request a pre-
liminary ruling from the Court of Justice, including after the review of constitutionality and 
also on the same grounds examined by the CC. Third, ordinary courts must disapply the 
national legislation that survived constitutional review, when the conditions for disapplica-
tion are met. Fourth, since the CC has the quality of a Member State “court or tribunal” 
under Art. 267 TFEU, it may well decide to submit itself a request for a preliminary ruling.  
Whilst formal compatibility of the new judicial course with EU law is now ensured,14 
its substantive impact remains largely ambivalent. As is evident, it has paved the way to 
 
11 In English, see D. GALLO, Challenging EU constitutional law: The Italian Constitutional Court's new 
stance on direct effect and the preliminary reference procedure, in European Law Journal, 2019, p. 434 et seq.; 
R. DI MARCO, The “Path Towards European Integration” of the Italian Constitutional Court: The Primacy of EU 
Law in the Light of the Decision No. 269/17, in European Papers – European Forum, Insight of 14 July 2018, 
www.europeanpapers.eu, p. 1 et seq.; P. FARAGUNA, Constitutional Rights First: The Italian Constitutional Court 
fine-tunes its “Europarechtsfreundlichkeit”, in VerfassungsBlog, 14 March 2018, verfassungsblog.de. The Ital-
ian literature is extensive; see, inter alia: C. AMALFITANO, Il dialogo tra giudice comune, Corte di Giustizia e Cor-
te costituzionale dopo l’obiter dictum della sentenza n. 269/2017, in Osservatorio sulle fonti, 2019, 
www.osservatoriosullefonti.it; R. MASTROIANNI, Da Taricco a Bolognesi, passando per la ceramica Sant'Agosti-
no: il difficile cammino verso una nuova sistemazione del rapporto tra Carte e Corti, in Osservatorio sulle fonti, 
2018, www.osservatoriosullefonti.it, p. 1 et seq.; P. MORI, La Corte costituzionale e la Carta dei diritti fonda-
mentali dell’UE: dalla sentenza 269/2017 all’ordinanza 117/2019. Un rapporto in mutazione?, in I Post di 
AISDUE, 3 September 2019, www.aisdue.eu, p. 55 et seq.; C. SCHEPISI, La Corte costituzionale e il dopo Taricco. 
Un altro colpo al primato e all’efficacia diretta?, in Osservatorio europeo, 31 dicembre 2017, 
www.dirittounioneeuropea.eu; L.S. ROSSI, La sentenza 269/2017 della Corte costituzionale italiana: obiter 
‘creativi’ (o distruttivi?) sul ruolo dei giudici italiani di fronte al diritto dell'Unione europea, in Federalismi.it, 31 
January 2018, www.federalismi.it; L.S. ROSSI, Il ‘triangolo giurisdizionale’ e la difficile applicazione della sen-
tenza 269/17 della Corte costituzionale italiana, in Federalismi.it, 1 August 2018, www.federalismi.it.  
12 See Constitutional Court: decision no. 20 of 21 February 2019; decision no. 63 of 21 March 2019; 
and decision 117/2019, cit. supra, fn. 4. Before order 182/2020, the CC confirmed the competence estab-
lished in decision 269/2017 also in decision no. 11 of 5 February 2020. 
13 Under the so-called “counter-limits” (controlimiti) doctrine (introduced by the CC in decision 
183/1973, Frontini), ordinary courts must refer to the CC when the applicable EU law provision (possibly, 
as interpreted by the Court of Justice) are in contrast with “the fundamental principles of the constitu-
tional order or of the inalienable rights of individuals”. The activation of a counter-limit precludes the ap-
plication of the EU law provision at stake, thus entailing a violation of the primacy of EU law. 
14 In its judgment of 22 June 2010, joined cases C-188/10 and C-189/10, Melki and Abdeli, para. 57, the 
Court of Justice held that Art. 267 TFEU does not preclude Member State legislation which establishes an 
interlocutory procedure for the review of the constitutionality of national laws “in so far as the other na-
tional courts or tribunals remain free: to refer to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling, at whatever 
stage of the proceedings they consider appropriate, even at the end of the interlocutory procedure for 
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new dynamics of interaction between ordinary courts, the CC and the Court of Justice. 
In this respect, one can see the risk of a domestic approach to the application of EU law 
within the scope of the EU Charter.15 At the same time, the new framework has some 
potential for triggering a process of mutual enrichment between European and national 
standards concerning fundamental rights protection.  
Both scenarios are open at present and, at first sight, ordinary courts are the decisive 
factor. However, how the CC exercises this new competence is crucial, as we shall see.16  
III. The main proceedings in order 182/2020  
Order 182/2020 derived from ten referrals of similar content which were raised by the 
Court of Cassation. The main proceedings originated from the National Institute for Social 
Security’s (INPS) refusal to grant a childbirth or maternity allowance to third country na-
tionals holding a single work permit or a permit for family reasons. INPS grounded its po-
sition on national provisions that require non-EU citizens to have long-term resident sta-
tus17 in order to qualify for the allowances at issue. Unlike INPS, first instance and appeal 
courts found that the national provisions were in contrast with Art. 12 of Directive 
2011/98/EU,18 which they considered to be applicable19 and endowed with direct effect.  
Art. 12, para. 1, of the Directive awards some categories of third country nationals the 
right to equal treatment as the nationals of the Member State in which they reside legally 
with regard to, inter alia, the “branches of social security issues as defined in Regulation 
(EC) 883/2004”20. Art. 3, para. 1, of this latter refers to “all legislation concerning […] ma-
ternity and equivalent paternity benefits [and] family benefits”,21 which include, in turn, 
 
the review of constitutionality, any question which they consider necessary; to adopt any measure neces-
sary to ensure provisional judicial protection of the rights conferred under the European Union legal or-
der, and to disapply, at the end of such an interlocutory procedure, the national legislative provision at 
issue if they consider it to be contrary to EU law. 
15 See infra, section 5. 
16 See infra, sections 6 and 7. 
17 This is conditional, in turn, upon possessing a valid residence permit for at least 5 years, as well as 
an adequate income and housing. 
18 Directive 2011/98/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on a 
single application procedure for a single permit for third-country nationals to reside and work in the terri-
tory of a Member State and on a common set of rights for third-country workers legally residing in a 
Member State. This Directive was implemented in the Italian legal order by the Legislative Decree of 4 
March 2014, no. 40. The latter limited itself to introduce some amendments to the Immigration Code of 
1998 (see supra, fn. 3), but no express provision was made to transpose Art. 12 of the Directive. 
19 Note that, in the two proceedings originated from INPS’ refusal to grant the maternity allowance, 
Directive 2011/98 was considered to be not applicable ratione temporis, because the relevant facts oc-
curred prior to the expiry of the deadline for the transposition of the Directive. 
20 Regulation (EC) 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the 
coordination of social security systems. 
21 See let. b) and j), respectively, of Art. 3, para. 1, Regulation 883/2004, cit. 
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“all benefits in kind or in cash intended to meet family expenses”.22 As regards the per-
sonal scope of equal treatment, it must be pointed out that Directive 2011/98/EU does not 
apply to third-country nationals who are EU long-term residents; the latter’s right to equal 
treatment as regards, inter alia, social security benefits is established by Directive 
2003/109.23 In other words, Art. 12, para. 1, of Directive 2011/98 extends the beneficiaries 
of equal treatment on social security issues24 to two categories of third country nationals: 
those who have been admitted to a Member State for purposes other than work in ac-
cordance with Union or national law, who are allowed to work and who hold a residence 
permit in accordance with Regulation (EC) 1030/2002; and those who have been admitted 
to a Member State for the purpose of work in accordance with Union or national law.25 
Lastly, Art. 12, para. 2, of the Directive lists the derogations from the right to equal treat-
ment that the Member States have the option of establishing.26 
First instance and appeal courts took the view that Art. 12, para. 1, of the Directive 
was applicable and endowed with direct effect. INPS, by contrast, insisted on classifying 
the childbirth allowance as an incentive, consequently falling outside the scope of Art. 
12. It also argued that, under the Directive, Member States can refuse benefits such as 
those at issue considering the financial resources available.  
The Court of Cassation opted to trigger a constitutionality review, in order to obtain a 
decision with erga omnes effect. It explicitly justified this choice in the light of the CC’s ap-
proach on dual preliminarity within the scope of the EU Charter, holding that the national 
provisions under review breached, at the same time, Arts 3, para. 1, and 31 of the Italian 
Constitution (on equality before the law and the protection of the family) and Arts 20, 21, 
24, 33 and 34 of the EU Charter (on equality before the law, non-discrimination, the rights 
of the child, family and professional life, and social security and assistance).  
 
22 More precisely, “all benefits in kind or in cash intended to meet family expenses, excluding ad-
vances of maintenance payments and special childbirth and adoption allowances mentioned in Annex I”. 
However, there is no mention of Italian allowances in Annex I. 
23 Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of third-country na-
tionals who are long-term residents. 
24 Note that the material scope of equal treatment is different: Art. 11 of Directive 2003/109 refers to 
“social security as defined by national law”, whereas Art. 3, para. 1, Regulation 883/2004, cit., contains a 
selection of branches of social security. 
25 See Art. 3, para. 1, let. b) and c) of the Directive 2011/98, cit., which Art. 12, para. 1, refers to. 
26 Member States must state clearly their intention to rely on derogations: see Court of Justice, 
judgment 21 June 2017, C-449/16, Martinez Silva, para. 29. 
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IV.  The main proceedings in order 182/2020  
The CC decided to join the referrals in order to address the questions “within the 
broader perspective of the provisions on social benefits to foreign nationals, also in 
light of the directions provided under EU law”.27  
At the outset, the CC confirmed its competence to verify, on a request by the referring 
court, whether the national provisions challenged violate the fundamental rights granted 
by both the Constitution and the EU Charter. It also recalled that, being a Member State 
“court or tribunal” pursuant to Art. 267 TFEU, it may issue a request for a preliminary rul-
ing and – in case, after the Court of Justice’s assessment – it may declare the contested 
national provisions to be unconstitutional, thus removing them with erga omnes effect.28  
The CC then announced its intention to request a preliminary ruling concerning the 
interpretation of the relevant EU law provisions. It acknowledged the existence of “an 
inseparable link” and a relationship of “mutual implication and fruitful supplementa-
tion” between the guarantees provided by the Constitution and those laid down by the 
Charter.29 It also affirmed that “[w]ithin an area that is marked by the growing influence 
of EU law [one cannot but prefer] a dialogue with the Court of Justice”.30  
After noting that Directive 2011/98 “must be brought within the [scope] of Article 34 
of the Charter”,31 the CC focused on the right to equal treatment in the area of social 
security as provided by Art. 12, para. 1, of the Directive. It found that the allowances at 
issue do not fall within the typical grounds of exclusion mentioned in Annex I to the 
Regulation,32 nor did the Italian legislator rely expressly on the derogations provided by 
Art. 12 when implementing the Directive.33  
The CC nonetheless considered that the existing case law of the Court of Justice34 
does not provide a clear answer on whether the allowances at issue qualified as “family 
 
27 See order 182/2020, cit., para. 2. 
28 The CC did not also repeat that ordinary courts remain free to raise themselves a preliminary rul-
ing to the Court of Justice, including after the review of constitutionality, and that they must not apply, in 
the pending case, national legislation that survived that review, when the conditions for disapplication are 
met. However, the general tenor of the Order suggests that nothing has changed in this respect. 
29 See order 182/2020, cit., para. 3.2. 
30 Ibid. The official English translation of the indent within the square brackets (“it is inconceivable 
not to promote a dialogue with the Court of Justice”) appears even stronger than the original Italian ver-
sion (“non si può non privilegiare il dialogo con la Corte di giustizia”). 
31 See order 182/2020, cit., para. 6.3.1. This point is discussed in depth infra, section 5. 
32 See supra, fn. 22. 
33 See supra, fn. 26 and the corresponding text. 
34 The Court of Justice (see, ex multis, judgment Martinez Silva, cit., paras 20-23, and the case law cit-
ed), the classification of a benefit as a social security benefit depends on its content and scope, whereas 
the name, method of financing and implementation are not relevant; notably, it must be granted auto-
matically to recipients that meet objective criteria, without any individual and discretionary assessment. 
The Court has also clarified that the expression “to meet family expenses” in Art. 3, para. 1, of Regulation 
 
8 Nicole Lazzerini 
benefits” under EU law. Notably, it found the classification of children allowance prob-
lematic, in the light of its dual purpose as a public contribution to families experiencing 
financial distress and as an incentive to childbirth. Therefore, it asked the Court of Jus-
tice to clarify whether the scope of Art. 34 of the EU Charter should be interpreted, ac-
cording to EU secondary law, as encompassing childbirth and maternity allowances and 
whether, in such a case, EU law precludes national provisions such as those at issue. 
V. An expanded scope for the CC’s dual preliminarity competence? 
Amongst the EU Charter provisions referred to by the Court of Cassation, the CC decided 
to focus only on Art. 34. This provision, titled “Social security and social assistance”, is cer-
tainly relevant ratione materiae to the case at issue, in particular its second paragraph 
(“Everyone residing and moving legally within the European Union is entitled to social se-
curity benefits and social advantages in accordance with Union law and national laws and 
practices”). However, considering the provision’s formulation, one may wonder whether 
the preliminary question raised by the CC should have rather concerned the (more de-
tailed) EU secondary legislation at issue, possibly interpreted in the light of Art. 34.35  
In effect, the CC itself, after stating that Directive 2011/98 “must be brought within 
the [scope] of Art. 34 of the EU Charter”, based its reasoning primarily on Art. 12 of the 
Directive, on the right to equal treatment as regards social security benefits. For the 
purpose of this Insight, the connection established by the CC between Art. 34 of the EU 
Charter and Directive 2011/98 deserves special attention. Basically, the CC confirmed, 
albeit implicitly, that its competence on dual preliminarity encompasses not only the EU 
Charter provisions, but also other EU law provisions concerning the protection of fun-
damental rights. Whilst this position is not completely new, in order 182/2020 the CC 
seems to further expand the scope of its review.  
In decision 20/2019,36 the CC already declared admissible a question of constitutionali-
ty concerning not only the EU Charter but also some (directly effective) provisions of a Di-
rective. The Court argued that these latter provisions showed “a singular connection with 
the relevant provisions of the EU Charter, not only in the sense that they provide it with de-
tails or implement it, but also in quite the opposite sense that they constituted the «model» 
for those rules and, therefore, they [contribute to providing evidence of the same nature as 
the EU Charter’s provisions], as expressed in the Explanations relating to the Charter”37. 
 
883/2004, cit., refers “in particular to a public contribution to a family’s budget to alleviate the financial 
burdens involved in the maintenance of children”.  
35 Cfr. the Art. 34-oriented interpretation of the principle of equal treatment between long-term resi-
dents and Member States nationals as regards social security, social assistance and social protection pro-
vided by the Court of Justice in its judgment of 24 April 2012, case C-571/10, Kamberaj, para. 76 et seq. 
36 See supra, fn. 12. 
37 The expression within square brackets is, in the author’s view, a translation closer to the Italian 
original (e perciò partecipano all’evidenza della loro stessa natura). 
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As was noted, this position is a logical implication of the rationale inspiring decision 
269/2017, namely the CC’s desire to re-take a role on fundamental rights’ adjudication 
within the scope of EU law.38 From an EU law perspective, however, one can see the risk 
that the possibility of raising a question of constitutionality, rather than following the 
Simmenthal case law (preliminary ruling and/or disapplication), is de facto extended to 
antinomies between national law and any EU law provisions with direct effect.39 As re-
peatedly clarified by the Court of Justice, the EU Charter is applicable in all situations 
where another legally binding provision of EU law applies.40 Considering the breadth of 
the fundamental rights granted by the EU Charter, the possibility of invoking its provi-
sions in combination with other EU law rules exists – plausibly – in the vast majority of 
cases within the scope of EU law.41  
Such an outcome would go beyond the stated justification of the new judicial 
course on dual preliminarity provided by the CC in decision 269/2017, namely the spe-
cific characteristics of the EU Charter as an inherently constitutional source. According-
ly, a question of constitutionality formally falling within the scope of the CC’s compe-
tence should be declared inadmissible when national legislation should be reviewed 
primarily against directly effective provisions of EU law other than the provisions of the 
EU Charter (or EU law sharing the same constitutional nature).42  
Against this backdrop, order 182/2020 provides ambivalent indications in relation to 
the scope of the CC’s competence on dual preliminarity. By explaining the relationship 
between Art. 34 of the EU Charter and Directive 2011/98, the CC confirmed that the new 
judicial course only concerns national legislation raising (genuinely and) primarily fun-
damental rights’ issues. On the other hand, it seems that the CC superseded the criteri-
on of the “singular connection” between the EU Charter and other EU law provisions 
identified in decision 20/2019, endorsing the (less stringent) logic of the material overlap 
between the two sources.  
Arguably, the CC did not mean to extend its review to all EU law rules falling within 
the material scope of the EU Charter – in practice, entire fields of EU law. It seems more 
 
38 See D. GALLO, Challenging EU constitutional law, cit., p. 451. 
39 Under this scenario, the status of the EU Treaties in the Italian legal order would be (almost) 
equated to that of other international treaties legally binding on Italy, the only difference being the possi-
bility – rather than the duty – to raise a question of constitutionality. 
40 See supra, fn. 6. 
41 Cf. R. MASTROIANNI, Sui rapporti tra Carta e Corti: nuovi sviluppi nella ricerca di un sistema rapido ed ef-
ficace di tutela dei diritti fondamentali, in European Papers, 2020, Vol. 5, No 1, www.europeanpapers.eu, p. 
493 et seq. Consider also that the EU Charter recognizes rights “for which provision is made in the [EU] 
Treaties”: see Art. 52, para. 2, of the EU Charter. 
42 Reference is, primarily, to the general principles of EU law concerning fundamental rights addi-
tional to those granted by the EU Charter and corresponding to fundamental rights protected by the 
Constitution, and to EU secondary law provisions that merely reflect a rule that may be inferred already 
from an EU Charter provision (see also infra, at the end of this section). 
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plausible – and acceptable, from the point of view of EU law – that the CC only wanted 
to encompass those EU law provisions that are more closely related to the EU Charter, 
as they give specific and concrete expression to the basic substantive content of the 
fundamental rights granted. 
If this reading is correct, the expansion of the scope of the CC’s competence that 
derives from order 182/2020 is more limited than what appears at first sight, at least in 
theory. In practice, the correct identification by ordinary courts of EU secondary law 
provisions that share the same nature as the EU Charter in the sense just explained 
may prove difficult and open to different interpretation.  
VI. The evolving approach to the preliminary ruling procedure  
The possibility of a direct dialogue between the CC and the Court of Justice was implicit 
in decision 269/2017. Only a few years earlier, the CC had overcome the case law in 
which it had taken the view that it could not be identified as a Member State “court or 
tribunal” for the purpose of Art. 267 TFEU.43 The CC indeed submitted a request for pre-
liminary ruling rooted in the new course on dual preliminarity already with order 
117/2019. However, this differs from order 182/2020 in some respects. 
Order 117/2019 originated from a case where the potential violation of a counter-
limit44 was at issue. The CC upheld the concern of the referring court (the Court of Cassa-
tion) and issued a preliminary ruling aimed at preventing the reliance on the counter-limits 
doctrine and the consequential violation of the primacy of EU law. Notably, it raised two 
questions: one on the interpretation of the relevant EU Charter provisions, and the other 
on the validity of the applicable EU secondary law rules, should it prove impossible to in-
terpret the EU Charter in harmony with the Italian constitutional tradition. By contrast, no 
counter-limits issues are at stake in order 182/2020. The CC’s decision to rely on the prelim-
inary ruling procedure was in fact premised on the “growing influence” of EU law on the 
matter of social benefits to foreign nationals and the “inseparable link” between relevant 
guarantees provided by the Constitution and the EU Charter.45 The rationale behind acti-
vating the dialogue with the Court of Justice thus differs: the CC tried to “shape” the inter-
pretation of the Charter in order 117/2019, whereas it requested the Court of Justice to 
provide the correct interpretation of the relevant EU Charter provisions in order 182/2020. 
 
43 The CC expressed this position, for the first time, in order 536/1995, relying on the peculiar tasks 
entrusted on it by the Constitution. The revirement took place in two steps: first, in relation to principaliter 
proceedings only (order 103/2008), and later on also with respect to incidenter proceedings (order 
207/2013). In the literature, see A. ADINOLFI, Una "rivoluzione silenziosa": il primo rinvio pregiudiziale della 
Corte costituzionale italiana in un procedimento incidentale di legittimità costituzionale, in Rivista di diritto in-
ternazionale, 2013, p. 1249 et seq. 
44 See supra, fn. 13 and the corresponding text. 
45 Order 182/2020, cit., para. 3.2. 
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Moreover, a different approach to the role of the preliminary ruling in cases falling 
under the new course on dual preliminarity emerges. In order 117/2019, the CC only 
confirmed its quality as a Member State “court or tribunal” under Art. 267 TFEU. By con-
trast, order 182/2020 acknowledges that the Court of Justice has the ultimate authority 
on the correct interpretation and application of EU law, quoting Art. 19, para. 1, TEU and 
stressing that “[the] clarification sought from the Court of Justice is conducive to ensur-
ing a guarantee of the uniform interpretation of rights and obligations under EU law”.46  
Looking at future cases raising dual preliminarity issues within the scope of the EU 
Charter, one may wonder whether ordinary courts can derive some indication from or-
der 182/2020 regarding the choice between the old Simmenthal-path (i.e., disapplying 
national law incompatible with EU law, after asking for a preliminary ruling, where nec-
essary) and the new one (i.e., prioritizing the referral to the Constitutional Court). As an-
ticipated, the CC clarified that ordinary courts have the possibility, rather than the duty, 
to raise a question of constitutionality in case law after decision 269/2017, but did not 
also provide – expressly, at least – any criteria to deal with two alternative paths.47  
The CC offered no explicit indications either in order 182/2020. At the same time, one 
general criterion seemingly emerges, albeit implicitly, from the Court’s general approach to 
the preliminary ruling and from the consideration that, in the case at issue, “[one cannot 
but prefer] a dialogue with the Court of Justice, which is charged with ensuring «that in the 
interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is observed»”.48 By acknowledging 
that the Court of Justice is the juge naturel on questions concerning EU law, the CC seem-
ingly suggests that ordinary courts should opt for the request for a preliminary ruling 
whenever the case raises doubts regarding the applicability, scope and effects of the pro-
visions of the EU Charter (possibly, in connection with other EU law rules).49  
If this is correct, when could – or should – the CC be involved? Some scenarios can 
be identified based on the case-law of the Court of Justice. The first scenario is the 
Egenberger-style situation, where the referring court was requested to ensure the ob-
servance of the relevant EU Charter provisions, endowed with (horizontal) direct effect, 
 
46 Ibid. 
47 In the aftermath of decision 269/2017, and before the important adjustments introduced later on 
by the CC (on which see section 2), the Court of Cassation did not always choose the same path in cases 
entailing the violation of fundamental rights granted both by the Constitution and by the EU Charter: for 
an overview, see A. COSENTINO, La Carta di Nizza nella giurisprudenza di legittimità dopo la sentenza della Cor-
te costituzionale n. 269/2017, in Osservatorio sulle fonti, 2018, www.osservatoriosullefonti.it. More recently, 
an Italian appeal court (the Corte di appello of Neaples) opted to raise, simultaneously, a constitutionality 
question and a request for a preliminary ruling: the case is commented in this review by R. MASTROIANNI, 
Sui rapporti tra Carte e Corti, cit., p. 509 et seq. 
48 Order 182/2020, cit., para. 3.2. 
49 Stressing that the Court of Justice is the juge naturel on the interpretation of the EU Charter, see 
L.S. ROSSI, Il ‘triangolo giurisdizionale’, cit., p. 12. 
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“while possibly balancing the various interests involved”.50 When hearing such cases, 
ordinary courts may find it appropriate to involve the CC, in order to ensure that the 
balance is achieved through a decision having erga omnes effect, for the sake of legal 
certainty and equal treatment.51  
Another scenario is the Fransson-style situation, where Member States can deter-
mine the standard of protection of the fundamental rights at issue, provided that “the 
level of protection provided for by the Charter, as interpreted by the Court [of Justice], 
and the primacy, unity and effectiveness of EU law are not thereby compromised”.52 In 
such cases, there is space for involving the CC when the standard determined by the 
national legislator meets the first condition of the Fransson-test, but fails to satisfy the 
(more protective) constitutional standard.  
Similarly, national measures adopted under a derogation provided by EU law, which 
comply with the Charter, can additionally be challenged against the Constitution. Unlike 
in the previous scenario, the second condition identified in Fransson (where the Court of 
Justice has the last say) does not apply, because the primacy, unity and effectiveness of 
EU law are inevitably enhanced by setting aside national derogations. 
Lastly, ordinary courts should raise a question of constitutionality when, under EU 
law, there is (or seems to be) no space for accommodating more extensive protection 
offered by the Constitution. This option must be preferred, clearly, when the (potential) 
violation of a counter-limit is at stake. This may occur in Melloni-style cases, where the 
level of protection is completely determined by EU secondary law,53 but also in Frans-
son-style cases if the national standard does not satisfy the second condition of the test. 
These situations call in question the possibility of interpreting the relevant EU Charter 
provisions in harmony with the corresponding constitutional standards. Thus, a direct 
interaction between the Court of Justice and the CC is the most appropriate path for 
exploring whether a convergence can be found, and possibly avoiding the reliance on 
counter-limits.54 This dialogue should be activated by a request for preliminary ruling 
inspired by loyal cooperation rather than a Taricco-style “threatening reference”.55  
 
50 Egenberger, cit., para. 81. 
51 Cf. C. AMALFITANO, Il dialogo tra giudice comune, Corte di Giustizia e Corte costituzionale, cit., p. 19. Ac-
cording to D. GALLO, Challenging EU constitutional law, cit., p. 450, “if uncertainty remains in respect to the pos-
sible emergence of a conflict between EU law and constitutional standards of protection as the result of a 
certain interpretation of domestic law […] the domestic court has a duty to dispel such uncertainty and, 
therefore, in the context of the same proceedings, refer the matter to the Constitutional Court”. 
52 Fransson, cit., para. 29. 
53 Court of Justice, judgment of 26 February 2013, case C-399/11, Melloni, para. 60.  
54 Cf. G. GAJA, Alternative ai controlimiti rispetto a norme internazionali generali e a norme dell’Unione eu-
ropea, in Rivista di diritto internazionale, 2018, p. 1035 et seq., notably p. 1050. 
55 The expression is used by D. PARIS, Carrot and Stick. The Italian Constitutional Court’s Preliminary Ref-
erence in the Case Taricco, in QIL-Questions of International Law, 31 March 2017, www.qil-qdi.org. 
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However, ordinary courts may opt to raise a constitutionality question also when, in 
a Melloni-style scenario, the standard of fundamental rights protection harmonised at 
the EU level is lower than the domestic one, even though no breach of a counter-limit is 
at stake. The EU harmonised standard must ensure a fair balance between the protec-
tion of the fundamental rights involved and the objectives pursued by the EU legislation 
at issue. One may not exclude that the latter objectives could be effectively achieved by 
endorsing a more protective standard than that identified by the EU legislator. The 
Member States’ governments may indeed be willing, during the EU lawmaking process, 
to level down the protection of the fundamental rights involved in order to find a com-
promise on the proposed legislation.56 Here comes the role of (all) national courts, in 
cooperation with the Court of Justice. Rather than challenging the EU harmonised 
standard because it does not align (or leave space) to the more protective domestic 
standard, national courts should contribute to ensure that the EU standard effectively 
offers a high level of protection, whilst not compromising the effective achievement of 
the objectives pursued by the EU legislator. In this scenario, ordinary courts may refer 
themselves a request for preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice, but they may also 
opt to involve the CC and invite it to activate a dialogue with the Luxembourg Court, 
should the CC share the concerns of the referring court.57  
VII. The choice of the parameters for constitutional review 
The CC’s approach to the parameters for constitutional review in order 182/2020 de-
serves a few comments. As anticipated, in decision 269/2017 the CC expressed its inten-
tion to carry out the review “in light of internal parameters and, potentially, European 
ones as well […], in the order that is appropriate to the specific case, including for the 
purpose of ensuring that the rights guaranteed by the [EU Charter] are interpreted in a 
way consistent with constitutional traditions”.58 Even though it is unclear how the “ap-
propriate order” between the two sets of parameters should be established, the Court’s 
statement suggests that the national provisions under review may be declared uncon-
stitutional against the EU Charter.59  
So far, the CC has opted to engage with the EU Charter and the relevant Court of 
Justice case law in interpreting the constitutional parameters, but ultimately based its 
 
56 The case of asylum legislation is illustrative: see C. FAVILLI, The standard of fundamental rights protec-
tion in the field of asylum: The case of the right to an effective remedy between EU law and the Italian Constitu-
tion, in Review of European Administrative Law, 2019, p. 167 et seq. 
57 I articulated this point in N. LAZZERINI, The standard of fundamental rights protection according to the 
EU Charter: Which role for national standards (and courts)?, in F. CASAROSA, M. MORARU (eds), The Practice of 
Judicial Interaction in the Field of Fundamental Rights - The Added Value of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the EU, Elgar, forthcoming. 
58 Decision 269/2017, cit., para. 5.2. 
59 Per Arts 11 and 117, para. 1, of the Constitution. 
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decision only on the latter.60 It is uncertain whether in case 182/2020, the CC will con-
firm this trend or opt to declare the national provisions unconstitutional against the EU 
Charter. However, one can clearly see an emphasis on the substantive connection be-
tween the Constitution and the EU Charter’s relevant provisions, “which […] comple-
ment each other and operate in harmony”.61 This marks a shift from decision 269/2017, 
where the Court’s reasoning about the different set of parameters available for consti-
tutional review was mainly inspired by a logic of separation.  
The approach to the EU parameters in order 182/2020 is also particularly welcome. 
The CC did not engage itself with the interpretation of Art. 34 of the EU Charter, but 
asked the Court of Justice to clarify its scope. As was suggested, national courts should 
contribute to achieving harmony between the EU Charter and the Member States’ 
common constitutional traditions62 by interpreting the constitutional provisions corre-
sponding to the relevant rules of the EU Charter; the interpretation of the latter in the 
light of the common constitutional traditions is, by contrast, the task for the Court of 
Justice.63 This type of “appropriate order” seemingly emerges from the statement made 
in order 182/2020 that “the questions referred for preliminary ruling […] have implica-
tions for the constant evolution of constitutional principles, as part of a dynamic of mu-
tual implication and fruitful supplementation”.64 
 
60 See R. MASTROIANNI, Sui rapporti tra Carte e Corti, cit., pp. 520-522. 
61 Order 182/2020, cit., para. 3.2. On a proposal for integrating the internal and EU parameters into a 
third “mixed parameter”, see A. CARDONE, Dalla doppia pregiudizialità al parametro di costituzionalità: il 
nuovo ruolo della giustizia costituzionale accentrata nel contesto dell’integrazione europea, in Osservatorio 
sulle fonti, 2020, www.osservatoriosullefonti.it. 
62 In decision 269/2017, the CC referred explicitly to Art. 52, para. 4, on which see section 6, in fine. 
63 See MASTROIANNI, Sui rapporti tra Carte e Corti, cit., p. 521 and fn. 70. 
64 Order 182/2020, cit., para. 3.2. 
